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This article develops a comparative analysis of the recent processes of creation of 
metropolitan governments in two European countries: England and France. Although 
coinciding in time, the new forms of metropolitan government are embedded in specific 
institutional systems. Comparative analysis focuses on the motivations of the actors of 
metropolitan reforms – government, parliament, local elected officials considering that this  
focus is important to explain the new modes of governance put in place. Finally, we analyse 
the capacity to act and the spatiality of the new metropolitan governments in both countries. 
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Over the past decade, several European countries have undergone institutional restructuring 
affecting different levels of government (Nunes Silva and Buek, 2017; Zimmermann and 
Getimis, 2017). These "territorial reforms" have modified the distribution of allocated powers 
and/or the geographical area of intervention of local authorities. Sometimes they institute new 
scales of action, thus drawing new spatialities for local public policies. These ongoing 
institutional changes seem to follow on from the movement towards decentralization which 
was particularly marked during the years from 1970 to 1990 (Béhar, 2015). Decentralization 
involves transferring competences and funding from the national government to the local 
level, giving local officials greater leeway to meet the needs of the population and specific 
target groups. In various European countries (Spain, France, Belgium, and Italy), 
decentralization has been a political response to a societal demand for autonomy - including 
for historic regional and national territories (Ismeri Europa and Applica, 2010). In the 2010s, 
territorial reforms have modified the balance of powers by reworking, often under the 
influence of reforms promoted by national governments and parliaments, the competences, 
capacities, and perimeters of intervention of certain local authorities. This is not necessarily a 
recentralization but may be a process driven by a government agenda which seek the 
reorganization of powers in the constituent territories of a state. This agenda is carried 
forward by national legislative and executive powers, but the resulting reconfigurations of 
territorial governance, may be contested by local authorities who, citing their electorally 
derived legitimacy; argue for the maintenance of sometimes long-established territorial 
boundaries and networks. In the French case, Feiertag (2018), drawing on analysis of 
parliamentary debates and official speeches, points to a search for many, and sometimes 
contradictory objectives: a desire to enhance the effectiveness of public action, territorial 
competitiveness, budgetary austerity, and, greater territorial equality. To this diversity of 
objectives, is added a plurality of means of implementation and acting. In some cases, 
national governments claim to want to simplify the nexus of territorial administration. The 
merger of provinces in Sweden and regions in France, or the abolition of counties in Denmark, 
illustrate this. Elsewhere, the aim is to provide densely urbanized areas with a more 
integrative level of action, even if it means adding a level to the hierarchy of local 
governments. The creation of Combined Authorities in England and the métropoles in France 
are two examples.   
 
Within the context of the territorial reforms introduced above, this text analyzes the institution 
of "metropolitan governments" (Lefèvre, 1998) for large cities and urban areas in France and 
England. We consider the evolutions which led to these reforms which aim at the 
reorganisation of the sub-national territories of public action, our analysis then focuses on 
several key issues: Do the reforms carried out constitute a radical change, or do they proceed 
by successive increments? Are there any quid pro quos granted by the State in return for the 
implementation of metropolitan reforms (for example, greater autonomy and/or financial 
support)? Having explored these issues it will be our contention that, far from being a 
response only to the management of metropolitan areas, the institution of metropolitan 








9.2 Research context and approach 
 
 
The type of territorial reform discussed in the introduction is rooted in spatial dynamics that 
are widely documented in geography and spatial planning. In recent decades, large Western 
agglomerations have experienced both economic and demographic growth (Scott, 2001, 
Herrschell, 2014) and a sharp increase in mobility, increased soil sealing and land 
consumption, rising socio-spatial inequalities and the emergence of conflicts related to the 
location of major infrastructure (Kunzmann 2004, Kirat and Torre 2008). In this context, the 
establishment of a metropolitan decision-making level could provide certain public authorities 
in large cities with a greater capacity to deal with issues affecting their territory. Such a 
process of institutional creation may adopt very different modes, ranging from creation by the 
state - like the communautés urbaines in France in the 1960s - to a voluntary approach of 
actors aligning themselves with a territory, or forms of negotiated settlement between the state 
and local authorities (Tomas, 2017). Different models of metropolitan governance can be 
distinguished according to the types of institutional arrangements that produced them (Breuer, 
2017). Alongside the metropolitan governments created explicitly by the law to deal with the 
challenges of very large cities, there are in some countries other more selective forms of 
metropolitan governance such as agencies that have been tasked with managing specific 
services like public transport, or waste management, over a large area. Metropolitan policies 
can also simply result from coordination between existing levels of local governments, 
whether they have the same competences (municipalities, for example), or not (regions, 
provinces, counties) (Tomas, 2017). 
 
The most institutionalized format of governing the metropolis - metropolitan government - is 
the subject of this chapter. Metropolitan government can be analysed for the scope of its 
powers, its autonomy vis-à-vis the higher levels of decision-making and its constitutive 
municipalities, and its democratic legitimacy (Lefèvre, 1998). Various authors have pointed to 
the failure, since the 1960s, of attempts to build institutions at this institutional scale (Sharpe 
1995, Lefèvre and Weir 2010). Following a comparative approach, developed by Lefèvre 
(1998) and pursued more recently by researchers such as Breuer (2017) and Breuer and 
Halleux (2016), we will explore here the metropolitan reforms carried out in two European 
countries: England and France. England is a nation of the United Kingdom, the most 
centralized country in Europe and, unlike Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, it does not 
have its own Parliament. For its part, France has experienced decentralization and more 
recently several institutional reforms affecting all levels of local government. By comparative 
analysis, our objective is to gain a fresh perspective, to identify what is essential, but also to 
isolate what is incidental, in the creation of metropolitan governments. To do this, it is 
necessary to identify the reasons for the establishment of institutions to govern the 
metropolises and to revisit the debates that have emerged within each nation. Although 
contemporaneous, the new forms of metropolitan government that have emerged in both 
countries are embedded in very different institutional systems (Section 9.3). The comparative 
analysis will focus on key protagonists in these processes, including central government, 
parliament, and locally elected politicians, considering that unpacking the motivations and 
goals of these agencies and actors, is key to understanding the new modes of governance put 
in place (section 9.4). Finally, we will analyse the spatiality of the new metropolitan 
governments in the two countries (section 9.5). In England, and in France, the new 
metropolitan governments account for 30.6% and 25.1% respectively of the population of the 
country concernedi. The geographic extent of the area they cover is more differentiated, with 
institutional metropolises accounting respectively for 8.9% and 2.1% of the national territories 
 
of England and France. These differences in spatial coverage need to be explained, as 
European cities are generally expected to contribute not only to the competitiveness of the 
economy, but also to the resource-efficient management of a functional urban region 
(Kunzmann, 2004, Nahrath et al., 2009). 
 
9.3 Institutional Systems in Evolution 
 
A classic typology of sub-national government systems distinguishes between northern and 
southern European models (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). The criteria used are the extent of the 
functions assigned at the local level, the legal discretion left to the local authorities and the 
access of local politicians to the national government. In the UK considered to be a "northern 
country", local authorities are traditionally conceived of as a mechanism for providing local 
services. Their actions have had to be exercised with reference to statutory duties attributed by 
Parliament and have often needed to comply with many national guidelines. This situation has 
evolved gradually with a ‘general power of competence’ for local authorities being introduced 
by the Localism Act (2011) (Sandford, 2016); though its introduction during the ‘austerity 
decade’ has limited the practical implications of this in many cases. In France, the action of 
local authorities is based on the conviction that the territories must be administered and 
developed according to local interests. France appears as a "southern country" where 
responsibilities and discretion are traditionally weak, but where there is access to central 
decision-making through the role played by a number of local elected representatives at the 
national level. However, France has experienced a process of decentralization that has 
strengthened the prerogatives of certain levels of local authorities. The United Kingdom has 
undergone a continuous process of reform of grassroots local government, with the aim of 
centralization, though a rhetoric of ‘localism’ has emerged in the 2010s. 
 
In both countries, the creation of metropolitan governments is not simply driven by the need 
to formulate responses at the "right" scale to some of the widely documented challenges 
facing European agglomerations, in terms of spatial planning, or of social development (Scott, 
2001; Kunzman 2004; Nahrath et al., 2009). The processes of defining a new framework of 
public intervention are anchored in the history of the institutional system specific to each 
country. In the remainder of this section, we will successively elucidate three dimensions of 
the institutional systems of England and France: the evolution of the pattern of local 
government as urbanisation has developed; the processes of decentralisation or centralisation 
that facilitate or hinder the emergence of a local capacity to act; the implementation of 
structural reforms aiming in particular at a greater control of local public expenditure. For 
each theme, the presentation of each national context will be followed by a comparative 
summary. 
 
9.3.1 The territorial mesh of basic communities: stability or evolution? 
 
The institutional systems of territorial administration are always part of specific geographic 
and historical dynamics (Breuer and Halleux, 2016). In 2017, England has 55 million 
inhabitants on an area of 130 000 km2, while France has 67 million inhabitants on a surface 
four times larger (550 000 km2). England is the country which had the earliest experience of 
the Industrial Revolution; more than half of the population was urban by the end of the 19th. 
century. Urbanization was later in France. Industry attracted rural populations to large cities 
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Source: Office for National Statistics, National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
 
 
The framework of local government is very different between the two countries. England has 
a variety of different forms of local administration for large cities, cities or sparsely populated 
areas. Since 2000, the 33 London boroughs have been joined by the Greater London Authority. 
The six major metropolitan county areas of Merseyside, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, 
South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear and the West Midlands are administered by 36 metropolitan 
districts. Non-metropolitan areas are governed either by 56 single tier ‘unitary authorities’, 
which manage all local services, or by a ‘two tier’ structure of 27 county councils and 201 
non-metropolitan districts. The total number of local government areas is small at 353, 
reflecting mergers in the second half of the 20th century. The average population of an 
English local government areas is over 170 000 inhabitants and the average surface area is 
greater than 400 km2; respectively 20 and 10 times more than an Italian commune, and 80 and 
25 times greater than the average French commune (Table 1). France has nearly 36,000 
municipalities, that is, 41% of all municipalities in the European Union for only 13% of the 
European population. France has not experienced a major reduction in the number of its 
municipalities. The institutional system of territorial government, designed at the end of the 
18th century for a rural country, must today cope with the fact that 80% of the population 
lives in towns and cities. 
 
Perhaps as a result of the context outlined above, in Europe, France presents a strong case of 
inter-municipal cooperation: all municipalities, whatever their size or geographical position, 
are currently involved in inter-municipal cooperation (Demazière, 2018). For more than a 
century, the provision of services (water, electricity, public transport etc.), or the management 
of waste, was delivered at supra-communal levels which allowed economies of scale. But they 
remained under the control of the municipalities, which decided every year the amount of 
grant to be allocated to support their provision. From the 1990s, the French State favoured the 
creation of établissement public de coopération intercommunale (public intercommunal 
cooperation institutions - EPCIs) to which municipalities voluntarily transfer resources (such 
as the tax paid by companies) and strategic competences such as economic development, 
culture, and housing. These EPCIs are eligible for major government subsidies, which has 
 
encouraged municipalities to engage in them. Baraize and Négrier (2001) have described 
inter-municipal cooperation as a "silent revolution". Although the elected members of these 
structures are elected at the municipal level and not directly to the EPCIs, the latter must be 
considered as an important level of French territorial authority, which is progressively 
replacing the communes. 
 
In both countries, urbanisation has put strain on the long-established, or sometimes even 
centuries’ old, framework of local government. In England as in other Northern European 
countries (like Germany, Belgium, and Sweden), the merger of local government areas has 
been pursued, resulting in a less fine grained territorial government framework. In France, the 
permanence of the communal map has given birth to an additional inter-communal network, 
which now applies across urban and rural areas in France. 
 
9.3.2 Decentralization or centralization? 
 
The United Kingdom remains one of the most centralized countries in Europe in terms of 
revenues collected and controlled by the state (Ismeri Europa and Applica, 2010). Since 1999, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have had their own parliaments that exercise certain 
powers. On the other hand, England does not have its own national parliament, or assembly, 
but is administered by the Parliament and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, there is no intermediate level in England between the central government and the 
country council, district, or unitary authority (Table 2). These are traditionally the executing 
agencies of the central power, acting in according with binding directives of the ministries. 
Their room for manoeuvre, which has become increasingly narrow since the 1980s, is limited 
to their ability to adapt these policies to the needs and expectations of the populations in their 
care (Breuillard, 2001). The rhetoric of ‘localism’ in the 2010s has done little to reverse this 
trend against a backdrop of regressive cuts, which have hit some of the poorest local authority 
areas hardest. Moreover, in the absence of a written constitution, the functions and the 
territorial organization can evolve according to the will of the government and the Parliament 
in place. Many reforms have been taking place for more than half a century, such as the 
amalgamation of districts, the abolition of some counties, the regionalisation attempt by the 
Blair government in the 2000s and its subsequent suspension by the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government in 2010 (Sykes and Nurse, 2017). 
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In France the regions were created at the beginning of the 1980s, while the departements and 
communes constitute a network that goes back to the French Revolution. The institutional 
system was then centralized, with a prefect, the local representative of the government in each 
département. Local and departmental elected officials were introduced at the end of the 19th 
century, but until the early 1980s, the prefect continued to lead the implementation of central 
government sectoral and spatial policies, while controlling the actions of local authorities. 
Since then, France has experienced decentralization and the centre of gravity of French 
institutions has moved from the centre to local authorities. The three levels of local 
government are now freely managed by elected councils, using their own resources (local 
taxes and other taxes) and allocations from the state. The principle of autonomy extends to 
relations between the local governments and none exercises control over another. This creates 
a very complicated institutional system, mocked by some as a territorial "mille-feuille". 
 
In total, the number of levels of subnational government is varied: very small in England, it 
reaches the number of three in France, bearing in mind that the structures organizing inter-
municipal cooperation (the EPCIs) are often considered to constitute a fourth level, given the 
importance they occupy today in local public policies (Baraize and Négrier, 2001). In addition, 
the capacity to act of different local governments is also diverse, depending on the degree of 
decentralization in effect. In both countries, the recent institution of a level of metropolitan 
government is part of this contrasting landscape. 
 
9.3.3 Controlling public spending, an objective shared today by national governments 
 
England was the first country in Europe to implement new public management. Under the 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher, the reforms launched from 1979 aimed at controlling public 
spending through major reorganisations of the administration. Local governments were 
targeted because they accounted for nearly 70% of public expenditure (Breuillard, 2001). 
State grants have been trimmed, local taxation and borrowing capacity have been regulated 
(Booth et al., 2007). Subsequently, the government was able to reduce local budgets in 
authoritarian fashion depending on whether or not the districts achieved spending control 
objectives. In addition, privatization policies directly concerned local authorities, in particular 
as regarded their social housing stock. 
 
In France, controlling local public spending is a much more recent topic. Thanks to 
decentralization, local authorities have the capacity to define their own agenda and fund their 
projects. At the end of the 2000s, spending by French local authorities accounted for 21% of 
general government expenditure, which is much less than in a regionalised country, such as 
Italy (31%) (Ismeri Europa and Applica, 2010). But financial autonomy is high in France: 
more than half of the local revenues of subnational governments come from local taxes. The 
proportion of locally raised funding is about 48% in England (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government, 2018).  Many French municipalities have promoted 
economic and residential development, sometimes generating, within the same agglomeration, 
territorial competition to attract or retain businesses and households (Hertzog, 2015). This 
competition has resulted in similar public investments (convention centres, business parks, 
etc.) in neighbouring municipalities. Vertical coordination among the three levels of 
government is also lacking. An extreme example can be cited in Marseille, where two 
museums dedicated to Mediterranean culture were opened in 2013, one financed by the 
municipality and the other by the region (Demazière, 2018). 
 
 
Inter-municipal cooperation has helped to unify public action in the major French cities and 
their suburbs, but only to a certain extent. Many periurban municipalities have grouped 
themselves into an EPCI in a defensive manner, to avoid being integrated into a larger 
structure where urban municipalities dominate because of their demographic weight. In 2010, 
there were more than 2,600 EPCIs for 300 functional urban regions (Geppert, 2014). By 
seeking to eliminate competition between municipalities, the state has stimulated the 
emergence of more powerful players, the EPCIs. In many cases, competition for employment 
and local taxation has been exacerbated within and between urban areas. This was probably a 
major cause of land consumption in France during the last decade (Serrano and Demazière, 
2016). 
 
In France, a general effect of the decentralization laws has been that elected officials have 
tended to increase public spending in order to respond to citizens' demands regarding the 
quality of public services. Local government spending rose from 5% to 8.5% of GDP between 
1983 and 2013, and according to the OECD (2015), more than half of this rise cannot be 
accounted for by the new competences it has acquired. In the 2000s, the salary costs of local 
government increased by about 3% per year due to the increase in the number of employees, 
inflation-linked salary scales and bonuses (Court of Auditors, 2014). While the national 
government has continuously supported this growth of local spending by increasing its grants, 
it changed tack in 2015, reducing subsidies to local governments for three years, and making a 
return to a stable level of support contingent on efforts to control local government spending. 
Indeed, the control of public spending has been one of the arguments deployed to justify 
territorial reform. 
 
9.4 The Establishment of new metropolitan governments in France and England  
 
In the previous section, we outlined the historical role of local governments and their 
strengthening or weakening according to the agenda of the national government. In both 
countries, these elements provide the backbone of the reforms undertaken over the past ten 
years to establish or consolidate local governments in for large metropolitan areas. In this 
section, our analytical framework will address several points. Do the reforms carried out 
constitute a radical change, or do they proceed by successive increments? Are there any quid 
pro quos granted by the State in return for the implementation of metropolitan reforms (for 
example, greater autonomy and/or financial support)? It will be seen that, far from being a 
response only to the management of metropolitan areas, the institution of metropolitan 
governments is part of a wider project of the national government of the country concerned. 
In England, it is a matter of selective decentralization on a case-by-case basis. In France, the 
metropolises are participants in a large-scale territorial reform, which affects all levels of local 
authorities without removing any of them. The metropolitan government is only one form of 
EPCI among others and in the final analysis, metropolitan governments are part of a pre-











Table 3 - Position of the Metropolitan Government in the Institutional Architecture 
 
England France 
Metropolitan District Commune 
  Etablissement public de 
coopération 
intercommunale 
Combined Authority Métropole 
 Département 
  Région 
Source: Author 
 
9.4.1 The establishment of Combined Authorities in England: a fluctuating interest for the 
local government of large cities 
 
In England, the question of metropolitan scale institutions is marked by the considerable 
weight of the United Kingdom Government. In the 1960s, the reflection on the fragmentation 
of the local government system led to the creation of the Greater London Council (GLC), then 
later in the 1970s to the creation of six Metropolitan County Councils (MCC) in charge of 
addressing strategic planning, transportation, economic development and waste management. 
Their role was close to that of French communautés urbaines (urban communities), created at 
about the same time. The MCCs operated from 1974 to 1986, before being abolished by the 
Thatcher government. The Labour Party controlled the MCCs and partly in response to this - 
and a classic (neo)liberal critique of their effectiveness and expenditure, their abolition 
became a campaign promise of the Tories during the general election of 1983. This was 
carried out once the Conservative majority was renewed on a tide of jingoism following the 
Falklands war. Their disappearance led to a lack of a strategic vision for metropolitan areas as 
different plans were now drawn up by the individual metropolitan districts for their own areas 
(Sykes and Nurse, 2017). 
 
In 1997, the accession to power of Tony Blair led to new reforms, but the big cities were not 
immediately on the agenda. After granting autonomy to the Celtic nations and establishing 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in England, the government recreated a tier of 
metropolitan authority for the capital: the Greater London Authority (GLA). Its main 
responsibility was to develop and adopt a metropolitan strategic plan. Gradually, the GLA 
acquired responsibilities for transportation, economic development, environmental 
management, policing, culture and sports, health and energy. In addition, the creation of the 
office of directly elected mayor and its effects in terms of leadership served as inspiration for 
the recent reform creating Combined Authorities. 
 
At the same time, the New Labour government's desire to make industrial and urban 
brownfields a lever for development led to a focus the big cities in the north of the country. 
The most acute phase of deindustrialisation being over, the latter were considered as the foci 
of future national growth, around the knowledge economy, innovation and creativity. In the 
mid-2000s, a number of official papers focused on functional urban areas, and led to a rising 
focus on city-regions, and the benchmarking of metropolitan institutions in other countries 
(Parkinson et al., 2004, Marvin et al., 2006). This attention to big cities was also driven by 
cooperation between local districts in some metropolitan areas - notably Greater Manchester. 
In addition, since 1995, the cities of Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield have been part of an English Core Cities Group. This 
 
organization only has an informal status but gives these regional cities higher profile and a 
certain collective lobbying capacity towards the UK government and European bodies. 
 
In 2009, the Brown government made local district cooperation for transportation and 
economic development possible by the establishment of Combined Authorities. After 2010, 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government abolished the regional organisations 
such as the Regional Development Agencies and implemented a public expenditure reduction 
program that targeted local government. In Manchester, the first Combined Authority was 
created in 2011. It brings together without merging them the 10 districts that had been part of 
the previous MCC of Greater Manchester. The main responsibilities of the new Combined 
Authority cover transportation, strategic planning, economic development, urban planning, 
housing and the police. Meanwhile the Core Cities Group has continued to advocate for a 
rebalancing of the national / local relationship by the government, the only solution it sees to 
meet the challenges of local economic growth, public service reform and better governance 
(Sykes and Nurse, 2017). This approach has had effects at the central level, with the 
government promoting Combined Authorities. The principle is that the districts wishing to 
cooperate submit a project to the government, which examines its content and territorial 
coherence and proposes (or not) to the Parliament the creation of the Combined Authority. A 
contract granting certain competences and resources (a ‘devolution deal’) is then signed 
between the government and the local authorities involved. Compared to local districts, 
Combined Authorities have greater powers in economic planning, urban renewal and 
transportation and exercise them over a wider territory. The competences attributed to the 
Combined Authorities and their resources are negotiated on a case-by-case basis between the 
local actors and the government, so they vary according to the areas.  Not all attempts to 
create Combined Authorities are successful, as shown by the case of Norfolk, whose 
Combined Authority project was rejected by the government because of the low degree of 
collaborative action envisaged, or that of the North East, whose districts have disengaged 
from the project invoking the risks to for public finances of the UK leaving the EU (Cléchet, 
2018). A law passed in 2016, The Cities and Local Government Devolution Act, allows 
Combined Authorities to acquire competences decentralized by the State, in addition to those 
pooled by the constituent districts, and to opt to have a directly elected metropolitan mayor. 
Six Combined Authority areas elected their mayor metro in May 2017. However, turnout for 
the election was low, varying between 21% and 34% of the electorate (BBC News, 2017). 
Though such weak democratic participation is not unusual for local elections, leading some 
observers to go so far as to comment that ‘British local democracy is that of a failed state’ 
(Jenkins, 2018). Still, as of July 2017, there were 9 Combined Authorities in total, but another 
five were under discussion. In addition, these structures are gaining momentum in terms of 
competences and the budgets of the Combined Authorities of Manchester and Liverpool each 
amounted to £230 million in 2017 (Cléchet, 2018). Though this needs to be set against the 
socially regressive cuts in local authority budgets since 2010 which have penalised some of 
the core metropolitan districts the hardest. Liverpool’s local authority has, for example, seen a 
real-term fall in spending of 32% from 2009/10 to 2017/18 (Thorp, 2019). The institution of 
Combined Authorities may thus allow the government to practice selective decentralization 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis with certain areas, but at the same time it is imposing 
budgetary austerity on some of the Combined Authorities’s constituent local districts, and 






9.4.2 The creation of metropoles in France 
 
After a phase of decentralization that strengthened the various levels of local authorities, 
territorial reform in France was justified, as in Italy, by the adoption of new public 
management (Wollmann, 2012). From 2000 to 2014, the annual expenditure of regions, 
departments, municipalities and EPCI increased from 152 to 247 billion euros, while local 
public employment increased from 1.5 million to 1.7 million. Between 2010 and 2016, two 
successive reforms of local authorities were carried out, first by a right-wing government and 
then by a socialist government. 
 
The first wave of reform was prefigured by an official report to President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
Entitled Il est temps de décider (It's time to decide), this report published in 2009 proposed 
the reduction of the number of regions through mergers, comprehensive national coverage of 
intercommunal cooperation, the setting of a population threshold for any EPCI, and the 
creation of métropoles (Comité pour la réforme des collectivités locales, 2009). At the time, 
these measures were not all implemented, many parliamentarians of all sides being hostile. 
Indeed, until the very recent prohibition of politicians holding multiple offices (2017), many 
Members of Parliament also headed local governmentsii. For decades, this has thwarted 
government efforts to reform the institutional system. 
 
Promulgated in 2010, the loi de réforme des collectivités territoriales (law for the reform of 
local authorities) forced the 2,000 municipalities still reluctant to engage in inter-municipal 
cooperation to join an EPCI. The law also put on the agenda the merger of some EPCIs, 
defining a minimum threshold of 5,000 inhabitants. This policy orientation was continued 
after 2012 by the socialist government, and in fact strengthened since the minimum 
population threshold of an EPCI was raised to 15,000 inhabitants. From 2010 to 2017, the 
number of EPCIs was halved, while the proportion of population covered by an EPCI 
increased from 89.1% to 100%. 
 
In 2015, the loi portant sur la nouvelle organisation du territoire de la République (law on the 
new organization of the territory of the Republic; often abbreviated to Loi NOTRe); clarified 
the responsibilities of the different levels of territorial authorities, in particular by removing 
the clause of general competence for the departments and the regions. The department is 
weakened being largely confined now to the maintenance of the road network and the 
payment of social benefits whose amount and rules of eligibility are decided in Paris. The 
government had even stated the intention to abolish the department as a local authority, but it 
had to back down. However, another reform was carried through, with the number of regions 
being reduced from 22 to 13, with in addition 5 regions overseas. At the time, the justification 
put forward by the government for this reform was the need to establish regions of ‘European 
size’ – i.e. more comparable to those in other European countries. 
 
As regards the creation of metropolises in France, there is also a certain continuity between 
governments of right and left. In 2010, the trend towards grouping together of independent 
municipalities led to the creation of a special status of metropolis for the biggest of these Paris. 
Despite opposition from the Ile-de-France region and neighbouring counties, this project was 
pursued by the socialist government after 2012. The métropole du Grand Paris (Greater Paris 
metropolis) was legally created on 1 January 2016 as an EPCI grouping Paris, the 123 
municipalities of the three neighbouring departments and 7 other communes -  i.e. 
approximately 7.5 million inhabitants. Similarly, the 2010 loi de reforme des collectivités 
territoriales (law for the reform of local authorities) made possible the creation of a new type 
 
of EPCI - called a métropole (‘metropolis’) - for any municipal grouping of more than 
500,000 inhabitants. The competences were those of a communauté urbaine (urban 
community), to which were added by legal transfer, or by agreement, certain competences of 
the departments and regions. However, elected officials had in fact wanted to create a 
métropole only in Nice, whose mayor was close to President Sarkozy. Also, in 2014, the loi de 
modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles (literally the 
‘law for the modernisation of territorial public action and affirmation of the metropolises’) 
revived the notion of a more integrated form of intercommunal cooperation. Under Article 43 
of this, the metropole is supposed to lead a “projet d’aménagement et de développement 
économique, écologique, éducatif, culturel et social [du] territoire afin d’en améliorer la 
cohésion et la competitivité et de concourir à un développement durable et solidaire du 
territoire régional” ("a development project for the economic, ecological, educational, 
cultural and social development of the territory, in order to improve cohesion and 
competitiveness and to contribute to a sustainable and equitable development of the regional 
territory” – author translation). In addition to Nice, the law designated eight "métropoles" on 
the basis of their communauté urbaine (urban community) status and their having more than 
400,000 inhabitants in an urban area of more than 650,000 inhabitants - namely: Bordeaux, 
Grenoble, Lille, Nantes, Rennes, Rouen Strasbourg and Toulouse. As mentioned above the 
metropolis of Greater Paris has its own bespoke arrangements. Its governance operates at two 
levels: the metropolitan level, and the territorial groupings of communes in different areas of 
the metropolitan region. The object of strong opposition from the mayors of Provence, the 
metropole of Aix-Marseille Provence, was created on January 1, 2016. The pre-existing 
EPCI’s were renamed “conseils de territoire” (territorial councils) and must be consulted 
before any decision taken by the metropole on territorial planning and local services. With a 
specific budget, they manage a certain number of powers delegated by the métropole. It is 
ultimately in Lyon, however, that the most complete form of metropolitan governance in 
France has taken shape.  Through a transformation of the communauté urbaine du Grand 
Lyon (the urban community of Greater Lyon), the new Metropole de Lyon has absorbed the 
skills of the Rhône department within its boundaries. Moreover, it is amongst the métropoles 
the only one to be a fully-fledged local authority, which will result in the direct election of  
metropolitan councillors in 2020. 
 
It is difficult to say whether these multiple reforms will improve the implementation of public 
policies at local level in the short term. Faced with a major public deficit, the socialist 
government had to take the unprecedented measure of reducing its grants to local authorities 
by 11 billion euros over the 2015-2017 period. The aim of this was to encourage them to 
reduce their operating expenses, but most of all there was a drop in public investment. 
Following the election of President Macron, the government elected in 2017 committed to not 
lowering grants to territorial authorities, which in practice meant that increases in their 
operating expenses would be limited to 1.2% per year. In addition, it is anticipated that 
municipalities will choose to transfer more responsibilities to voluntary groupings in order to 
achieve economies of scale. The métropoles illustrate this logic since their creation leads to 
new transfers of powers by municipalities. There is a strong local appetite for this institutional 
form since urban areas that did not reach the threshold of 400,000 inhabitants have sought and 
managed to transform themselves into métropoles: three in 2015 (Brest, Montpellier and 






9.5  Characteristics of Metropolitan Governments 
 
Work on the emergence or institution of a metropolitan government has identified three main 
features (Sharpe 1995, Lefèvre 1998). The first concerns a strong political legitimacy, 
obtained by the direct election of its political representatives. We must distinguish here 
between the “inter-communal” model and the “supracommunal” model. In the first case, the 
political legitimacy derives from the representatives of the member communes. However, the 
metropolitan governments need their own political legitimacy so that actions carried out are 
accepted as they apply to everyone; notably to their constituent local authorities. The direct 
election of their executives is considered as an essential ‘input’ (Taylor, 2018) element of this 
legitimacy – i.e. in terms of representation of the governed and consultative mechanisms. 
 
Secondly, the metropolitan government must enjoy significant autonomy vis-à-vis higher 
levels of government as well as in relation to its own constituent local authorities. This is 
acquired through adequate financial (and human) resources and significant powers to 
intervene in metropolitan affairs (Lefèvre, 1998). The policy fields generally mentioned are 
strategic territorial planning, economic development and the management of infrastructure 
networks (transport, water, sanitation, waste treatment), fire services, and culture. Finally, it 
must have an institutional geography roughly corresponding to the functional urban area. 
These elements are needed to bolster the ‘output’ legitimacy of the metropolitan government - 
i.e. its effectiveness in acting in the interests of the governed and its “problem solving 
quality” – Schmidt, 2013).   
 
These characteristics would allow the metropolitan institution to be legitimate, powerful and 
autonomous. But there is clearly a gap between such theoretical notions and practice. We will 
see that the Combined Authorities and the French métropoles are both incomplete according 
to the criteria defined in the literature, but in different ways. 
 
9.5.1 Size and geographical area of metropolitan institutions 
 
Firstly let’s consider variables that can be measured quantitatively, namely the population and 
area covered by the 23 metropolitan governments identified in both countries (Figure 1). A 
strong heterogeneity emerges. Almost two thirds of the territories have a population of less 
than 1 million inhabitants (from the West of England downwards) and some in France even 
have a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants. In addition, the comparison of Sheffield 
and Lyon shows that population and area are not always correlated. An institutional 
metropolis covering a large population can be established within a small area, while a large 
land base does not necessarily mean a major demographic weight. Following the preceding 
sections, there are also substantial differences between the two states. In terms of population, 
5 out of 8 Combined Authorities (West Midlands, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, 
Liverpool, Sheffield) are in the top third of the territories in Figure 9.1 and none are present in 
the bottom third. French métropoles are divided into two distinct groups. A handful of major 
cities (Paris, Marseille-Aix and to a lesser extent Lyon and Lille which exceed 1 million 
inhabitants) contrasts with most others which lie in the bottom third of the graph and occupy 
the last 9 ranks. These different spatialities are not the result of chance. They are linked to the 








Fig 9.1 - Population and area of Combined Authorities and Metropolises 
 
Authors: Christophe Demazière & Chaymae Ez-Zriouli 
Source: National data - England: July 2017; France: population on 1/1/2014, area on 1/1/2017 
 
Overall, Combined Authorities have an average population of around 1.4 million, compared to 
700,000 for French métropoles outside Grand Paris. Their area is three times greater than their 
equivalent in France (2,300 against 750 km2). In France, the smallest metropolis - Brest - 
represents 3% of the population of Greater Paris and 11% of that of Aix-Marseille Provence. 
And of the 17 metropolitan areas of less than 1000 km2 shown on the graph, only 4 are 
Combined Authorities – these being also the largest among these smaller territories, and the 
13 others are all French métropoles. 
 
The larger geographical area of the Combined Authorities aims at capturing a functional 
regional reality. In France, the process of metropole creation was essentially a question of 
renewing the perimeters of pre-existing EPCIs - with the exception of Marseille-Aix and 
Greater Paris - and not of transforming départments into metropolitan authorities. This leads 
to a major difference: 7 French métropoles out of 15 have a population lower than that of the 
corresponding unité urbaine (urban unit) and 9 have a population less than two thirds of that 
of the région urbaine fonctionnelle (functional urban region) (Demazière, 2017). 
 
9.5.2 A very variable degree of autonomy 
 
The autonomy of a type of metropolitan government can be assessed vis-à-vis the state, which 
is often at the origin of its creation, and other higher, or lower, levels of territorial government. 
Below we examine these two dimensions of metropolitan-regional relations in the two 
national contexts under consideration here (for a more comprehensive treatment see 
Cremaschi et al., 2015). 
 
In England, metropolitan cooperation is presented as taking a "pragmatic" form, with the first 
step being the coming together of metropolitan districts to negotiate with the state, the 
business community and civil society around specific policy goals and projects. As a result, 
shared, or decentralized competences, differ from one Combined Authority to another, as do 
 
the resources allocated by the government. On an experimental basis, some Combined 
Authorities have been able to keep local business rates paid by companies. Although the rate 
of this tax is fixed by the government in a uniform manner for the whole country, this 
constitutes a beginning of fiscal decentralisation. Moreover, in addition to resources related to 
the transfer of competences - for example £6 billion of health and social care funds transferred 
to Greater Manchester - the government has committed itself to funds of around £ 250 million 
each year for the territories that have signed devolution deals. 
 
The situation in France is different, even if a metropolitan fund with €150 million euros has 
been set up, its importance is limited because the metropoles are part of a long history of 
decentralization and reinforced inter-municipal cooperation, which has constantly increased 
the room for manoeuvre of the local elected officials involved. As far as their relations with 
the central government level are concerned, the métropoles have a much greater autonomy 
than the Combined Authorities, whether in terms of competences or fiscal resources. Local 
elected officials can even play a vital role in the creation of the métropole. Take for example 
the lobbying by elected representatives from certain big cities who succeeded in February 
2017 - thanks to an amendment tabled under the loi Grand Paris (Grand Paris law); in 
modifying the métropole designation criteria, allowing a second wave of seven métropoles to 
be created.  The list of these speaks volumes of local influence on the process: Clermont-
Ferrand, Dijon, Metz, Orleans, Saint-Etienne, Toulon and Tours, being rather intermediate 
cities as opposed to metropolises (Deraeve, 2014). Here was an excellent illustration of the 
effects of multiple office holding (e.g. the holding of local and parliamentary mandates by the 
same individuals) on the framework of French territorial governance structures, in this case 
only a few weeks before the prohibition of this practice. 
 
The wide autonomy of the French communes and their groupings vis-à-vis the State 
underpinned the fact that the functioning of the communautés urbaines (urban communities) - 
which prefigured the métropoles - was variable in space and time, and with regards to the 
‘buy-in’ and inclusion of actors in the project (Lefeuvre, 2015). This diversity is mainly due to 
the relations between the representatives of the main commune and the mayors of the other 
communes, with a lower demographic, economic and political weight. In Toulouse or 
Grenoble, for example, elected officials have feared the hegemony of the central city, 
something strongly felt in the past, and are wary of an inter-municipal structure that would 
reduce their control of their own communal territory (Escaffre and Jaillet, 2015; Louargant 
and Le Bras, 2015). Conversely, in England, given the merger of the districts in the 1980s, the 
Combined Authorities only bring together a small number of them – ranging from 4 districts 
for West of England to 10 for Greater Manchester. According to Leclercq and Loew (2017), 
territorial governance is more "balanced" than in France. For example, in Greater Manchester, 
the population of the local authorities brought together by the Combined Authority (e.g. 
places like Salford, Trafford, Oldham etc.) is more comparable than is typically the case of the 
constitutive communes of the French métropoles, even if the central city of Manchester still 
has the greatest demographic weight. In Manchester, strategic planning and the management 
of key services have been transferred to the Combined Authority, while in France this point is 
problematic for mayors. Yet the transfer of competences and their exercise in practice may be 
two different things – for example, the production of a Greater Manchester Spatial 
Framework (GMSF) has been marked by public protests from those who jealously guard local 
planning power, notably as regards to any changes to designations of Green Belt land (Green, 
2019).  As regards economic development, in England 38 Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) between businesses and local authorities are supposed to encourage synergies between 
sub-regional/city regional governance and the business sector.  In certain places such as 
 
Greater Manchester and the Liverpool City Region, the area covered by the Combined 
Authority is the same as that covered by the LEP. This isn’t always the case though and in the 
West Midlands, three LEPs cut across the Combined Authority area. In theory these 
partnerships can play an important role in the decisions of the new Combined Authorities 
whereas in the French case, the establishment of conseils de développement (development 
councils) does not apparently lead to joint decision making. 
 
 
9.6  Discussion: Governing the metropolis or the urban region? 
 
 This section provides a comparative discussion of the findings as presented in Table 4 below.  
 





Previous reforms of boundaries and decentralisation 
Reform of local 
government areas 
Yes, in the 1970s 
 
No (failure of a reform in the 1970s). 
Encouragement of inter-municipal 
cooperation addressed to all municipalities 
becoming almost mandatory in the late 
2000s. 
Since the 1960s, financial and institutional 
support of the State to the grouping of 
communes in the big agglomerations 
Decentralisation  No. Recentralisation from the 1970s and a 
single level of territorial authority 
 
 Yes (since 1982). Three levels of local 
government, including regions created in 
1982 






Yes, since the 1980s.   
A decrease in the scope and spheres of 
action of local authorities 
 
 Yes, since 2015. A decrease in state grants 
to local authorities 
 Metropolitan government model 




 Intercommunal model but metro mayor 
elected by direct universal suffrage (realized 
in 6 out of 8 cases) 
  
The president of the métropole is elected by 





 Variable from one Combined Authority to 
another. They are pooled by the districts or 
decentralized by the government. 
Competences are limited and often involve 
urban transport, strategic planning, 
economic development, urban planning, 
housing and police 
 
Homogeneous with the exceptions of 
Greater Paris and Lyon. 
The competences are very significant: 
spatial planning; economic, social and 
cultural development; local housing policy; 
urban policy ; protection and enhancement 
of the environment and local 
amenity/liveability ; management of public 
services of collective interest 
Territorial extent Large (average area of 2,300 km2) and often 
centred on the core of the functional urban 
area 
 
Smaller (average area of 750 km2), less  
than the built-up area in the case of half the 
métropoles 
 Source: Authors 
 
The first part of Table 4 above underlines the vital role played by the national government vis-
à-vis local and regional authorities. In both France and England actions have been carried 
 
over the long term by the national level, in terms of reforms of the framework of territorial 
government, and the competences and autonomy granted (or not) in terms of financial 
resources and expenditure to sub-national levels. In both countries, urbanization and peri-
urbanization have tested the relevance of the established geography of sub-state government, 
but it has only been significantly reworked - and expanded – in England. In France, bypassing 
the fierce resistance of mayors to the merger of municipalities, the state has strongly 
encouraged and stimulated inter-municipal cooperation. The gradual deepening of the latter in 
the largest cities has brought into being more and more integrated local institutions, 
prefiguring the emergence of true metropolitan governments. In effect the laws of the 2010s 
only formalised this status, even if, in the case of Greater Paris and Aix-Marseille Provence, 
the state imposed the metropolitan reform on the municipalities and departements concerned. 
 
In both cases, the old relations between state and local governments are both a resource and 
an obstacle for the institution of a metropolitan level of government. For example, the 
resistance of other levels of local authorities to metropolitan reform. This was a sensitive issue 
in France, but several elected officials who simultaneously held the positions of mayor of a 
big city, president of an EPCI, and parliamentarian forged an alliance with the government to 
ensure reform succeeded. In England, the strong culture of centralisation sees Combined 
Authorities emerge from national legislation under which groups of two or more local 
authorities may come forward seeking to collaborate and take collective decisions across 
council boundaries. The success of bids to become a Combined Authority is not guaranteed 
and they must be approved by the Secretary of State, alternatively the latter may decide to 
establish a Combined Authority, if the councils in the relevant area agree (Sandford, 2017). 
The fields of action and resources of a Combined Authority are granted by the UK 
government, which then evaluates their actions, illustrating "remote government" (Epstein, 
2005). 
 
The second part of Table 4 summarizes, in both countries, the characteristics of metropolitan 
government considered essential by Lefèvre (1998) and examined in section 9.5 above. The 
only common feature of the two countries is the importance for the new metropolitan 
institutions of the relationship to the constitutive local authorities within their areas who are 
the stakeholders in the new metropolitan governance. In France, the legitimacy of 
municipalities is strong, which limits the autonomy of the metropolitan government in dealing 
with them. The metropolitan councillors, who represent the local municipalities, elect the 
president of the métropole, which open the possibility of electing another figure than the 
mayor of the main core city and municipality of the area. This is the case for Greater Paris, 
Aix-Marseille Provence, Lyon, Lille - the four largest French métropoles by population - as 
well as for Grenoble, Strasbourg and Nancy. In England, the legitimacy of the districts is 
much weaker, which has allowed the national government to push for the direct election of a 
metropolitan mayor, and this has not happened in most, though no all, areas. 
 
In terms of competences, the Combined Authorities seem to illustrate, an experiment in 
decentralization in a highly centralized country, which initially has principally targeted the 
largest cities. The process of case-by-case formalization of devolution deals is probably less a 
reflection of the national government's desire to address the heterogeneity of the issues facing 
these large agglomerations than of limiting the possibility of a common expression of these 
claims. Combined Authorities are an experiment to which it is always possible to put an end. 
In contrast, French métropoles are part of a longer-term evolution and have an almost unique 
set of competences. These are only restricted for Greater Paris, which leaves the organization 
of mobility or the tendering of energy networks to the Ile-de-France region. In contrast, the 
 
Lyon métropole has added to its core fields of activity the exercise within its area of the 
competences of the Rhône departement (social action, construction and maintenance of 
secondary schools, and management of the road network). In France, the unique format of 
modes of action is questionable, given the strong heterogeneity of the métropoles. It might be 
thought probable too, that in the smaller métropoles, action in some policy fields will not be 
very developed, in light of a lack of expertise, or because - despite what may be claimed; 
some dimensions of 'metropolisation' are not very present (Deraeve, 2014). 
 
Regarding the boundaries of the institutions created, path dependency seems to outweigh the 
importance of introducing a new territorial framework well-adapted to addressing issues of 
spatial planning. In England, the territorial extent of Combined Authorities is wide. However, 
the establishment of new relations between the state and the local does not revolve 
exclusively around the metropolitan spaces of large city regions. Thus, Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough is a Combined Authority for a territory of interlinked medium-sized cities, and 
the government has also signed devolution deals with non-metropolitan areas such as 
Cornwall, and Greater Lincolnshire. The level of centralization and the hegemony of the 
London agglomeration in the national economy, do count for nothing in accounting for the 
difficulties that the big cities of the North of England experience in being recognized as key 
sites for future decentralisation-fuelled development. In the mid-2010s the UK government 
started evoking the notion of a 'Northern Powerhouse', as an urban ensemble made up of the 
conurbations of Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle. By fostering this 
group of cities, the stated strategy was to counterbalance London's economic growth. This 
territory is superimposed on that of the very big cities around which Combined Authorities 
have emerged and seeks to unite these historically rival cities across the geographical and 
cultural distance which separates them. 
 
In France, the narrowly drawn boundaries of the métropoles created by the metropolitan 
reform is in direct continuity with the geography of pre-existing forms of intercommunality. It 
is on this territorial basis that some elected officials have launched, since decentralisation, 
daring and striking urban projects including- urban regeneration operations, tramway lines, 
and business centres. These elected officials sometimes had very high national level political 
responsibilities, for example, mayors of Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, and Nantes, have all at one 
time led the national government.  Perhaps as a result of this, from Lyon to Metz, from 
Toulouse to Brest, the representation and conception of the metropole is urban-centric. It is 
attached to the (larger or smaller) central city of an urban area and extends little beyond the 
urban core. This narrowness of the territorial base of the métropole still leaves the urban 
region, or the wider metropolitan area, fragmented at the level of local government. This can 
make it difficult to cooperate with surrounding areas.   
 
 
9.7 Conclusion  
 
 
In geography and spatial planning, an abundant literature has emerged which celebrates 
metropolitan spaces as centres of innovation, competitiveness and wealth creation (Scott, 
2001, Parkinson et al., 2004), and points to the multiple spatial issues that call for the setting 
up of institutions dedicated to their governance (Kunzmann, 2004, Nahrath et al., 2009). 
However, since the 1990s, many studies in political science have shown the difficulties which 
can accompany the emergence, or creation, of metropolitan government (Sharpe 1995, 
Lefèvre 1998). In their comparative analysis of institutional reforms in metropolitan areas in 
 
Europe and North America, Kantor and Savitch (2010: 129) point out that "national 
government responses are by no means a mere reflection of an evolution of economic 
pressures. On the contrary, regional governance policy is invariably a matter of contention”. 
The findings of this chapter confirm these analyses. England and France are two European 
nations with relatively similar levels of development that face similar challenges. But distinct 
paths have been taken towards the establishment of metropolitan government. This is 
explained partly by the interactions between the distinctive national institutional systems, 
which have evolved over a much longer time period than that over which the recent reforms 
have been introduced, and the more recent agenda setting of the respective national 
governments regarding the metropolitan issue. The findings underline the importance of the 
role of national governments which have orchestrated change over the long term, successively 
reforming the framework of territorial government, and the competences, autonomy and 
resources available to sub-national levels. In both countries, urbanization and peri-
urbanization and new functional geographies have tested the relevance of the established 
geography of sub-state government, whilst established relations between state and local 
governments have shaped the emergence new governance scales. At times there has been 
resistance to the metropolitan reform from existing local authorities who fear a loss of 
autonomy, but such antagonism is by no means ubiquitous and in both countries there were 
examples of cooperation across and between government scales. The presence of such similar 
dynamics around the formation of metropolitan governments in two different national 
institutional and political settings, also points to the need to be sensitive to sub-national 
contexts (e.g. specific city regional settings) and avoid the trap of ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (Reimer et. al. 2014, p. 3) which seeks to account for differences solely in terms 
of different national systems. Yet some fairly clear national differences remain such as the 
influence of the relative strength of local municipalities vis-à-vis new metropolitan 
institutions which is stronger in France, and the national government’s encouragement of the 
election of metropolitan mayors in England. Meanwhile, whilst Combined Authorities can be 
seen as the latest manifestation of England’s rather stop-start quest to develop some kind of 
‘larger than local’ scale of sub-national territorial governance, French métropoles are part of a 
more consistent longer-term evolution of decentralisation processes. Yet the territorial extent 
of Combined Authorities is England is wide, contrasting with the narrowly drawn boundaries 
of the métropoles which generally remain calibrated on the pre-existing intercommunal spaces 
and rather urban-centric leaving wider metropolitan areas, fragmented at the level of local 
government. Ultimately, in both countries, the choices around the spatial bounding of 
metropolitan governments are based on context-dependent factors. Allied to the competences 
of the new metropolitan governments, which vary between the two countries and sometimes 
within the same country, these boundaries will certainly influence the capacity of the public 
authorities to deal with the multifaceted issues encountered in the development of 
metropolitan areas. It should be remembered too that far from being solely a response to the 
management of metropolitan areas, the institution of metropolitan governments in both 
countries takes place against a background of wider national government political agendas 
and projects. It is clear that many aspirations and agendas have been attached to the new 
metropolitan governments.  Given this, it is perhaps too early to say, how far they will acquire 
their own political legitimacy, in terms of 'output' effectiveness in addressing the issues which 
provided the rationale for their creation, and citizen identification with and ‘input’ to the 
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i For England, the number of Combined Authorities taken into account in this article is those which were 
established by July 2017. For France, we have taken into account here only the 15 métropoles resulting from the 
loi de modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles (law of modernization of 
the territorial public action and the affirmation of metropolises) of  2014, leaving aside those that were created in 
2017. Indeed, the aim is not to conduct an exhaustive analysis of metropolitan areas, but to compare the national 
determinants of the implementation of these new levels of government. 
 
ii In 2012, 82% of deputies of the assemblée nationale and 77% of senators held at least one other elected office. 
The proportion of parliamentarians at the head of a local executive (mayor or chairman of a county or regional 
council) was 45% for the deputies and 48 % for senators. These figures make France an exception in Europe. In 
Italy, 16% of parliamentarians hold at least one other elected office, 15% in Spain, 13% in Great Britain and 10% 
in Germany. In January 2014, the French parliament adopted a law prohibiting the combination of local 
executive functions with a deputy or senator's post. This law came into force on March 31, 2017. 
